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BUSINESS TRUSTS IN CHINA: A REALITY CHECK 
Lusina Ho* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, China took the bold step of enacting the Trust Law.1  It is 
remarkable for a communist country to adopt a legal institution that was 
originally created to preserve wealth for the landed gentry in England.2  It 
is even more extraordinary that the business trust was promoted by the 
Chinese government long before the (relatively simpler) family trust took 
root.  These facts make China’s enactment of the Trust Law provides an 
interesting case study for how a socialist, civil-law jurisdiction with a 
rudimentary private law system may put in place a sophisticated legal 
concept that has taken the West centuries to develop. 
Indeed, China had a lot of ground to cover in a short period of time.  
The development of private law was not a high priority during the early 
decades after the establishment of communist China.3  Accordingly, soon 
after China adopted the Open Door Policy in 1979, it began enacting 
specialist statutes on private law areas like contract,4 property,5 and 
company law,6 to name but a few, in order to fill gaps in its private law 
 
* Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong, email: lusinaho@hku.hk.  I am grateful to Ronald Fung, 
Yongshan He, and Kenny Kwok for research assistance.  The usual caveats apply. 
 1. Trust Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 28, 2001, effective 
Oct. 1, 2001) (China) [hereinafter “Chinese Trust Law”], 
http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/laws/China/Trust%20Law%20of%20People%27s%20Republic%20of
%20China.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WRR-RLDE]. 
 2. Stephen Tensmeyer, Modernizing Chinese Trust Law, 90 N.Y.U.L. REV. 710, 712 (2015). 
 3. The General Principles of the Civil Law, which contained rudimentary provisions on 
personhood, obligations and property, were only enacted in 1986. General Principles of the Civil Law 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_3343_0_7.html [https://perma.cc/T252-VCN8]; Albert Chen, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 29-30 (2019, 5th ed); J 
Quigley, Socialist Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 37 AM. J. COMP. LAW 781, 782 (1989).  It was only 
in 2017 that China promulgated the General Provisions of Civil Law as the first step towards the enactment 
of a comprehensive Civil Code: General Provisions of the Civil Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), CLI.1.291593(EN), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c12435/201703/7944f166a8194d788c63cc6610aebb4a.shtml (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans. http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=291593 
[https://perma.cc/5EF6-ESVC ]. 
 4. Contract Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, 
effective Oct. 1, 1999) (China), http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_2741_0_7.html 
[https://perma.cc/UJ7M-JZV3]. 
 5. Property Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, 
effective Oct. 1, 2007) (China), 
http://english.www.gov.cn/services/investment/2014/08/23/content_281474982978047.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WMB2-VAY7 ]. 
 6. Company Law (Revised 2013) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
1
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system.  As China interacted more with common law jurisdictions in 
trade, finance, and investment, the influence of those common law 
jurisdictions impacted Chinese law.  The Chinese government’s adoption 
of Trust Law is one example of this trend.   
Soon after the enactment of the Trust Law, the Chinese enacted two 
main administrative regulations to govern the licensing and operation of 
trust companies and the collective-investor trusts (‘CIT’)—a form of 
business trust that can only be operated by trust companies.7  The business 
trust is championed as an instrument for funnelling private capital to 
desirable investment targets that are crucial to the rapidly growing 
economy.8  These legislative initiatives in trust law fuelled explosive 
growth in the trust industry.  The total assets managed by trust companies 
skyrocketed from USD 39 million in 2003 to USD 3.27 trillion by March 
2019, over 83,000 times its value in 2003.9  However, trust businesses in 
China bears little resemblance to those in Western countries.  Private 
wealth management took up only 16% of the revenue of the Chinese trust 
industry.  The balance is split equally between single-investor trusts 
(‘SIT’) and CITs, both of which are trusts in name only.10   
SITs involve a single settlor and are typically used by commercial 
banks in collaboration with trust companies to provide unofficial lending 
in the shadow of the state credit system.  CITs pool funds from investors 
but promise them fixed rates of return over a set period of time, 
irrespective of the value of the underlying assets.  Many CIT products are 
sold by state-owned banks, giving customers the appearance that they are 
backed by a governmental guarantee.  Therefore, CITs are trusts in name, 
but in substance they are fixed income products often used to sidestep 
regulatory constraints.  This rendered the trillions of dollars invested in 
 
Dec. 28, 2013, effective Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4814_0_7.html 
[https://perma.cc/2Q3Z-C5HR]. 
 7. Measures for the Administration of Trust Companies (promulgated by the China Banking Reg. 
Comm’n (“CBRC”), Dec. 28, 2006, effective Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-
03/28/content_563583.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans., 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=83c9e8177e31ca76bdfb&lib=law [https://perma.cc/657N-P24X]; 
Measures for the Administration of Trust Companies’ Collective Trust Plans (promulgated by the CBRC, 
Dec. 17, 2008, effective Feb. 4, 2009) (repealing the 2007 Measures by the same name) [hereinafter “CIT 
Measures”], http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2009/content_1456086.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2020), 
unofficial trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=122991 [https://perma.cc/MTB5-
VNXP]. 
 8. Eric Linge, Trust as Institutions in China’s Financial Markets, 3 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 
283 (2011). 
 9. Main Business Data of Trust Companies at the End of the First Quarter of 2019, CHINA TR. 
ASS’N [hereinafter Main Business Data], http://www.xtxh.net/xtxh/statistics/45321.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9L7Z-DR9L]. 
 10. Torstein Ehlers, Steven Kong, & Feng Zhu, Mapping Shadow Banking in China: Structure 
and Dynamics 16-17 (Bank for Int’l Settlements Working Paper No. 701, 2018), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/work701.pdf [https://perma.cc/62G4-NH66]. 
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them extremely vulnerable to regulatory corrections.   
Compounding the regulatory risks are the inadequacy of private law 
remedies for breach of trust and the failure to utilise the judicial process 
to enforce these remedies.  The Trust Law was enacted in broad strokes 
that leave many conceptual issues about the rights and remedies of the 
beneficiaries unanswered.11  For example, the degree to which China 
replicates the proprietary remedies that have made the trust such an 
attractive institution in the common law world is unclear.  These 
uncertainties could have been resolved by the courts through the 
adjudication of trust disputes, but unfortunately the regulators have been 
too fast to intervene by administrative means.  
In light of these challenges, this Article examines the unique 
phenomenon of the Chinese business trust.  It argues that a major reason 
why proper business trusts have not yet taken root in China is her systemic 
failure to appreciate and adhere to the core principles of trust law.  This 
systemic distortion is shared across private investors, trust companies, 
and regulators.  Regulatory tightening is only partially effective in guiding 
the industry to legitimate trust business.  The key to accomplishing this 
goal lies in implementing the core principles of trust law in judicial 
practice. 
In what follows, Part 2 will outline the business trust as it was originally 
conceived by the law drafters.  Part 3 will compare this vision with the 
reality of Chinese business trusts to show how the trust concept has been 
systematically distorted and abused.  It will also examine the partial 
success of regulatory efforts to rein in such trusts.  Part 4 will argue that 
only when the core features of the trust have taken root in Chinese private 
law would the trust industry be able to truly break away from its currently 
problematic business model.  To this end, the Article will identify what 
these core problematic features are and then propose specific amendments 
to the Trust Law to resolve these problems. 
II. BUSINESS TRUSTS: THE VISION 
The Chinese Trust Law was introduced in 2001 to tighten up the 
supervision of trust and investment companies.  These were non-bank 
financial institutions that the Chinese government revived at national and 
provincial levels after the adoption of the Open Door Policy. Their main 
purpose was to obtain extra-budgetary investments to fund infrastructure 
and development projects that burgeoned in China.12  However, their 
 
 11. See generally LUSINA HO, TRUST LAW IN CHINA (2003); Lusina Ho, Rebecca Lee, & Jin 
JinPing, Trust Law in China: A Critical Evaluation of its Conceptual Foundation, in TRUST LAW IN ASIAN 
CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 80, 85-91 (Lusina Ho & Rebecca Lee eds., 2013). 
 12. See Vincent Pace, Comment: The Bankruptcy of the Zhu Kuan Group: A Case Study of Cross‐
3
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business model was limited, and was comprised primarily of so-called 
“trust deposits.” Trust deposits were fixed deposits, or “trust loans,” 
whereby these companies acted as agents between companies lending to 
each other.  There was no ring-fencing of funds that was fundamental to 
a trust, nor was the investor’s investment returns, which were interests 
paid on the deposits, linked to the performance of the underlying assets.  
It was thought that the Trust Law could set forth the legal requirements 
of a trust, and help guide these companies to develop proper trust 
businesses.13 
The drafters thus laid down a framework of “one law, two 
regulations”14 for trust activities, whereby the Trust Law introduces the 
essential features of the common law trust into China and the regulations 
provide a legal footing for the operation of trust business.  Crucially, the 
Law affirms the axiom of the segregation of trust property from the 
personal property of the trustee, and the principle that the trust property 
includes all properties derived from the initial trust property, whether 
lawfully or not.15  None of these notions were previously embraced in 
China in relation to the trust.  
The two core regulations aim at steering the trust industry towards 
proper trust business and giving them a core competitiveness against other 
financial institutions.  They are: (1) the Measures for the Administration 
of Trust Companies (“Trust Companies Measures”),16 which govern the 
 
Border Insolvency Litigation against a Chinese State‐Owned Enterprise, 27 U. PA. J. INTʹL ECON. L. 
517, 520-21 (2006). 
 13. Lusina Ho, Trust Law in China: History, Ambiguity and Beneficiary’s Rights, in RE-
IMAGINING THE TRUST: TRUSTS IN CIVIL LAW 183, 188-89 (Lionel Smith ed., 2012). 
 14. This was reinforced in 2010 by the Measures for the Administration of Net Capital of Trust 
Companies (promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission, July 12, 2010, effective Aug. 
24, 2010), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-09/10/content_1699764.htm [https://perma.cc/8CLD-DPMK], 
unofficial trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=8343&lib=law [https://perma.cc/WQD5-VBJV].  
The Measures mandate internal risk control mechanisms in trust companies and a minimum ratio of 40 
per cent net capital to net assets. 
 15. Chinese Trust Law, supra note 1, arts. 14 & 15. 
 16. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  There are other laws, regulations and guidelines that 
pertain to the trust, such as Securities Investment Fund Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2003, rev’d Dec. 28, 2012, effective Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2015-07/03/content_1942864.htm [https://perma.cc/S7U6-
ZZAF], unofficial trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=cd8acac44fc18cabbdfb&lib=law 
[https://perma.cc/M33G-YQ6T]; Measures for the Administration of Financial Asset Investment 
Companies (for Trial Implementation) (promulgated by the China Banking and Ins. Reg. Comm’n 
(“CBIRC”), June 29, 2018, effective, June 29, 2018), 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/newShouDoc/2F17C2C95E724066818561C7D2F622D8.html (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans., 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=8f3f09dee23f2c64bdfb&lib=law [https://perma.cc/337W-E33A]; 
Measures for the Administration of Wealth Management Subsidiary Companies of Commercial Banks 
(promulgated by the China Banking and Ins. Reg. Comm’n, Dec. 2, 2018, effective Dec. 2, 2018), 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/newShouDoc/C441E44624394A76B25051CA7F4AFE5C.html (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans., 
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licensing and operation of trust companies and place them under the 
supervision of the former China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(“CBRC”); and (2) the Measures for the Administration of Trust 
Companies’ Collective Trust Plans (“CIT Measures”), which set out the 
rules for operating CITs and give trust companies an exclusive licence to 
operate them.17  They were regulated by the CBRC, which was merged in 
April 2018 with the China Insurance Regulatory Commission to form the 
China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (“CBIRC”).18 
This regulatory framework puts in place three important measures to 
carve out a special role for business trusts.  First, CITs may invest across 
an unrestricted range of markets in debt, equity, property and any other 
means,19 a privilege not enjoyed by other financial instruments such as 
securities investment funds or real estate investment trusts.  Second, trust 
companies have an exclusive licence to operate CITs.  In granting trust 
companies the privilege to operate the only cross-market investment 
product in the financial market, the regulators have given them a core 
competitiveness over other financial institutions.  Third, to counteract the 
higher investment risks that stem from this unique flexibility, CITs are 
subject to strict conditions on the number of individual investors and the 
threshold investment amount of each investor.  For example, the 
minimum investment by any investor in a CIT is CNY 1 million (about 
USD 150,000).  Individual investors in a CIT must pass an asset- or 
income-based test.20  In any trust plan, there can only be at most 50 
individual investors that invest less than CNY 3 million each.  These 
restrictions aim at confining CITs to high net-worth individuals and 
institutional investors, who have a higher risk tolerance and are more 
 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=17f5d34771cda0f4bdfb&lib=law [https://perma.cc/MP5Z-
Z9VV]; Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Wealth Management Business of 
Commercial Banks (promulgated by the China Banking and Ins. Reg. Comm’n, Sept. 26, 2018, effective 
Sept. 26, 2018), http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2018/content_5350052.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 
2020), unofficial trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=4a42780a616a0fe3bdfb&lib=law 
[https://perma.cc/EK43-RYY8]; and Guidelines on Due Diligence of Trust Companies in Fiduciary 
Duties (promulgated by the China Trustee Ass’n, Sept. 1, 2018, effective Dec. 31, 2018, 
http://www.xtxh.net/xtxh/u/cms/www/201809/19095441wnkx.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial 
trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=aba940dce2d97fa1bdfb&lib=law [https://perma.cc/UL8A-
FASV]. 
 17. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 18. Zhongguo Yinhang Baoxian Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Zhengshi Guapai [The China Banking 
and Insurance Regulatory Commission Officially Begins Operation], CHINA BANKING REGULATORY 
COMM’N (Apr. 9, 2018), 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/newShouDoc/EB7840D7EA7344CEBFAD044E5CDE33DA.html (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2020). 
 19. CIT Measures, supra note 7, art. 26. 
 20. Individual investors must either have at least CNY 1 million assets by themselves or with 
family members, or an annual income of over CNY 200,000 by themselves or CNY 300,000 with their 
spouses in the three years prior to the investment.  
5
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sophisticated investors.21  While CITs are privately placed investment 
trusts that pool funds from two or more investors, SITs serve single, large-
scale investors who are typically financial institutions.  
The light regulation of CITs and trust companies are designed to 
encourage the development of innovative and tailor-made investment 
structures for sophisticated investors.  In the years following the 
enactment of the regulations, the CBRC through continuous notices 
provided guidance to trust companies on the operational models of 
innovative investment trusts.22  It sought to assign trust companies the de 
facto role of domestic private investment banks, which have yet to appear 
in China.  This is due, in one part, to the heavy regulatory constrains 
placed on state commercial banks to provide such financial services, and, 
in another part, to the underdevelopment of debt equity markets in China.  
High hopes are thus placed on trust companies to channel capital to those 
segments of the economy that are cut off by this market vacuum, and the 
business trust is a key instrument in this design.  
III. THE REALITY: SYSTEMIC DISTORTION OF THE TRUST 
The CIT has proven to be extremely popular.  The percentage share of 
industry assets held under such trusts rose from 13% in 2010 to 42% in 
the first quarter of 2019, at a value of CNY 9.5 trillion (USD 1.3 trillion).23  
But a closer examination reveals a reality that is in sharp contrast to their 
intended function.  Trust companies manage CITs no differently as banks 
would with fixed deposit instruments, pocketing profits they made from 
the underlying investment after paying the promised rate of return to 
 
 21. The CBRC has indicated its intention to issue the Measures for the Management of Capital 
Trusts before the end of 2019. Yinjianbaohui: Zhengqu Niandiqian Tuichu Jijin Xintuo Guanli Banfa 
[China Banking and Insurance Commission: Seeking to Promulgate the Measures for the Management of 
Capital Trusts Before the End of the Year], SEC. DAILY (China) (Mar 1. 2019), 
http://epaper.zqrb.cn/html/2019-03/01/content_413640.htm?div=-1 [https://perma.cc/W64R-SNNB].  
The Measures will provide for public placement capital trusts with a significantly lower threshold 
requirement of CNY 10,000 (about USD 1,500), which will be subject to the same, more stringent 
regulatory requirements of other investment products such as securities investment funds. 
 22. Notice on Issuing the Guidelines for Trust Companies to Operate the Trust Private Equity 
Investment Business (promulgated by the CBRC, June 25, 2008, effective June 25, 2008) 
http://fgcx.bjcourt.gov.cn:4601/law?fn=chl474s509.txt (last visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans. 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=21222b478d90acc1bdfb&lib=law&EncodingName=big5 
[https://perma.cc/3ZPT-EPV9]; Notice on the Relevant Issues Concerning Supporting the Innovation and 
Development of Trust Companies (promulgated by the CBRC, Mar. 25, 2009, effective Mar. 25, 2009), 
CLI.4.142650(EN) (Lawinfochina), unofficial trans. 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8682&CGid= [https://perma.cc/BY7S-Q7HL], 
article 10 of the 2009 Notice was revoked by paragraph 3 of the Notice on Strengthening the Supervision 
of the Structured Trust Business of Trust Companies (promulgated by the CBRC, Feb. 5, 2010, effective 
Feb. 10, 2010), unofficial trans. http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=2e35ce36e7d8efdfbdfb&lib=law 
[https://perma.cc/X6Y3-JMEF].  
 23. See Main Business Data, supra note 9. 
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investors.  Investors also treat trust products as high-yield bonds, and 
expect trust companies or local authorities to bail out these trusts should 
they default.  The regulators, all too eager to avert any social instability 
that may stem from trust defaults, intervene to tackle transgressions by 
administrative intervention, thus suppressing the development of private 
law remedies for breaches of trust.  A closer look at each of these 
problematic aspects is now in order. 
A. Fixed Income Products 
In actual practice, CITs are fixed income products and a far cry from 
their ideal form as private placement trusts meant to be tailormade for 
sophisticated investors.  A significant proportion of them are initiated by 
state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) and local government financing 
vehicles as a financing platform.  Trust companies, mostly controlled by 
local governments, do not actively manage a diversified portfolio of 
fluctuating assets under the trusts.  Rather, fund investments take the form 
of extending loans to the initiators in return for interest and serve the 
purpose of financing the latter’s business projects or real estate and 
infrastructure projects.  The trust plans are for a set period of time, usually 
one to two years, at a fixed return rate of some eight to nine percent, which 
is much higher than the capped interest rates of bank deposits that do not 
apply to trusts. 
The structure of a typical CIT can be illustrated by a trust plan initiated 
by SPIC Xianrong (Shanghai) Assets Management Co Ltd, an ultimate 
subsidiary of one of the top five electricity generation companies in 
China.24  In this plan, SPIC Xianrong issued a wealth management 
product to provide financing for Rongjiang State-owned Assets 
Management Co Ltd, the investment arm of the Rongjiang county in 
Guizhou.  Qualified investors subscribed to the wealth management 
product at a minimum threshold of CNY 1 million.  The pooled funds 
were then used to subscribe to a CIT, which loaned the funds to Rongjiang 
Assets Management to finance the county’s government projects to 
relocate the poor for urbanization.  The subscription was for a fixed period 
of 2 years at 7.5% interest rate (or 7.9% for investors of a higher amount), 
with interest payable bi-annually.  The loans to the county’s asset 
management company were secured, inter alia, by six plots of lands 
owned by the county government in prime location in the city center.  The 
offering of government land as security was designed to instil investor 
 
 24. Diagram adapted from 2019 Chengtou Weiyuechao Laishi Xiongxiong [The Tidal Wave of 
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In this arrangement, even though the borrower of the loan was an asset 
management company, it was obvious that the main driver and architect 
of the CIT was the government of the Rongjiang County.  The trust 
company’s role as trustee was purely passive.  In this regard, it is very 
telling that the sales information of the trust specifically mentioned, as a 
point of attraction, the availability of “support of government 
documents.”  Since local governments are under strict prohibition from 
running deficits to fund government projects, CITs allow them to obtain 
non-standard financing for these purposes.  In reality, they are high yield 
government bonds that conceal the true extent of the fiscal deficit and run 
a high risk of default because of the lack of a diversified investment 
portfolio.25 
B. Illusory Investor Protection 
Apart from not operating CITs as genuine investment trusts, trust 
companies also pay lip service to investor protection measures that are 
applicable to such trusts.  Article 6 of the CIT Measures imposes a 
threshold investment amount of CNY 1 million from individual investors 
and requires them to satisfy an asset- or income-based test.  Articles 7 and 
8 stipulate prudence measures such as mandatory risk disclosure, 
disclosure of the professional qualification of trust company personnel, 
and prohibition on misleading statements.  Yet, Article 8(3) also allows 
trust companies to delegate the distribution of trust plans to other financial 
institutions, but unfortunately does not stipulate any duty of supervision 
on the part of the trust companies or liability for the distributor’s 
 
 25. Id. 
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wrongdoing. 
As trust companies do not yet have any established client base of their 
own, they typically delegate the distribution of trust plans to commercial 
banks owned by local governments. In fact, a majority of the plans are 
sold by third-party intermediaries that are not financial institutions.  This 
is problematic for several reasons.  First, these institutions are loosely 
regulated and ill-equipped to distribute high-risk investment products to 
their client base of small investors.  Second, since Articles 7 and 8 only 
apply to trust companies, these provisions are easily bypassed once 
distribution is delegated to another institution.  Third, trust companies 
also delegate the screening of qualified investors to intermediaries 
without monitoring compliance with the regulation.  Worse still, to boost 
their business volume, it is not uncommon for the intermediaries to split 
the minimum subscription of CNY 1 million into smaller units, thus 
defeating the original design of confining CITs to sophisticated investors 
who are better placed to absorb investment losses than small investors.26  
Fourth, since the intermediaries charge fees, it is not in their interest to 
make full disclosure of the risk rating of the products; in fact, they often 
encourage investors’ assumption that the local governments will bail out 
the plans at default.  There is thus very little investor awareness of the 
risky nature of the trust plans, let alone the fact that the high interest rates 
are precisely because the underlying borrowers cannot obtain credit from 
state banks. 
Regulatory response is slow and piecemeal.  It was not until 2014 that 
the matter was addressed in the sub-provisions of the Notice on Improving 
the Organizational Management System of Banks’ Wealth Management 
Business27 and the Guiding Opinions on the Risk Supervision of Trust 
Companies of 2014.28  Article 4 of the Notice prescribes prudential 
measures on the sale of wealth management products by banks, including 
making clear statements in sales brochures that “wealth management 
products are not deposits, and are subject to investment risks.”  Article 2 
of the Guiding Opinions affirms the need for strict adherence with the CIT 
Measures, namely the requirements on private placement, qualified 
 
 26. Hsu Mou yu Wang Mou Hezuo Hetong Jiufen An (许某与王某合作合同纠纷案)[A Case 
Concerning the Dispute over the Cooperation Contract between Hsu and Wang], Beijing Yizhong Min 
Zhong Civil Case No. 7332, (July 12, 2012) (China). 
 27. Notice on Issues Concerning Improving the Organizational Management System of Banks' 
Wealth Management Business (promulgated by the CBRC, July 10, 2014, effective July 10, 2014), art. 4, 
para. 1, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2014/content_2781483.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2020), 
unofficial trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=229217&lib=law [https://perma.cc/T9SU-
9XEU]. 
 28. Guiding Opinions on Regulation of Risk Supervision of Trust Companies (promulgated by the 
CBRC, Apr. 8, 2014, effective Apr. 8, 2014), art. 2, para. 2, unofficial trans., 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=22196&lib=law [https://perma.cc/4VGB-L99W]. 
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investors, as well as risk and information disclosure, so as to prevent 
intermediaries from transferring sales risks to trust companies.  But just 
as the original CIT Measures were largely ignored, there is little evidence 
that the subsequent instruments have been heeded. 
A further attempt to improve investor protection was made in the 
Administrative Measures for Trust Registration of 2017,29 which sought 
to launch the long-awaited system for trust registration mentioned in 
Article 10 of the Trust Law of 2001.  The Measures provide for 
registration of trust products and the beneficial rights held under them.  
This involves pre-registration of a trust product five working days prior 
to its issuance, and initial registration within ten working days of 
establishment.30  Apart from basic information about the trust product, the 
trust company must also disclose the source of trust property, trust 
property management plan, transaction structure, risk warning statements, 
risk-control measures, and information on off-site promotion.31  It is 
noteworthy that beneficiaries are allowed to open a trust beneficial right 
account to record their beneficial rights and changes to these rights with 
the trust registration corporation.32  Beneficial right registration is by the 
real name of the beneficiary, such that the rights, if any, of sub-owners of 
investment units in CITs will not be registered.  To track changes to 
beneficial rights, the Measures mandate further registration of trust 
variation and termination, as well as correction of inaccurate information 
in the registry.33 
Most recently, in September 2018, the China Trustee Association 
issued Guidelines on the Due Performance of Trustee Duties by Trust 
Companies, which provide that in marketing trust products, trust 
companies shall conduct knowing-your-client procedures to match 
clients’ risk assumption capabilities with their investments, and prepare 
marketing information themselves for distribution by sale 
intermediaries.34  
These guidelines affirm the regulator’s commitment to steering trust 
business to its originally intended scope, but still fall short of providing 
concrete directions to achieve this goal.  For example, the Measures for 
Trust Registration does not guarantee compliance of trust products with 
the regulations, nor the continuous validity of registered information 
 
 29. Notice on Printing and Distributing Administrative Measures for Trust Registration 
(promulgated by the CBRC, Aug. 25, 2017, effective Sept. 9, 2017) 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2018/content_5254334.htm [https://perma.cc/5TJY-PHFV]. 
 30. Id. at arts. 10-11. 
 31. Id. at art. 10(1). 
 32. Id. at arts. 22-29. 
 33. Id. at arts. 12-15. 
 34. Guidelines on Due Performance of Trustee Duties by Trust Companies, supra note 16, arts. 13 
& 17. 
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about the investment value and risks of trust products.35  Besides, 
registration of beneficial ownership is voluntary.36  Moreover, the 
Measures provide for registration of trust products but not trust property 
itself, and leave open the question as to whether the former is deemed to 
include registration of trust property.  In a civil law jurisdiction such as 
China, registration of trust property is crucial to the enforceability of the 
beneficiary’s right against third parties.  Before these questions are 
resolved, the utility of the Measures lies only in providing a public 
repository of information on trust products.  They have achieved very 
little in enhancing the protection of investors’ beneficiary rights. 
Second, it is ironic that when detailed provisions on investor protection 
were finally issued, they were promulgated in much weaker form as 
industry guidelines issued by the China Trustee Association.  In any 
event, the tightening of investor protection rules will only achieve partial 
success in developing proper trust practice in China.  In so far as CITs 
continue to provide fixed return rates not based on the periodic 
performance of the underlying asset, investors will treat them no 
differently from high-yield bonds.  In fact, a more serious problem is that 
Chinese investors assume that there will be implicit guarantees of such 
returns. 
C. Implicit Guarantee 
1. The emergence and prevalence of implicit guarantee  
A fundamental principle of trust law is that profits and losses arising 
from the use of trust property are attributable to the beneficiary.  
Specifically, in the absence of any breach of duty by the trustee, 
investment losses are borne by the beneficiary.  This principle stems from 
the notion of trust property as a segregated and fluctuating fund held by 
the trustee on behalf of the beneficiary.  Yet the Trust Law does not 
expressly provide for this principle, and stops short at merely stipulating 
the segregation of the trust fund.37  Furthermore, Article 34 of the Trust 
Companies Measures and Article 8(1) of the CIT Measures only focus on 
prohibiting trust companies from guaranteeing any minimum return or 
promising the absence of investment loss.  The principle is indirectly dealt 
with in the provisions of the CIT Measures pertaining to disclosure of 
risks to investors.  Articles 11(3) and 14 of the CIT Measures respectively 
provide that statements of subscription risks and trust contracts should 
 
 35. Administrative Measures for Trust Registration, supra note 29, art. 19. 
 36. Id. at art. 22. 
 37. Id. at art. 16. 
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declare that risks arising from authorised trust activities shall be borne by 
the trust property. 
In reality, however, CIT contracts stipulate fixed rates of return 
irrespective of the performance of the underlying asset.  Furthermore, 
investors expect eventual government rescue of the trust plan by way of 
so called ‘rigid payment’ (gangxing duifu).  This phrase was coined to 
mean that when a plan defaults on maturity, the trust company or even the 
local government—who is technically not the borrower—will make 
partial or full payment from their own assets or other sources of funding.  
While trust companies avoid making any express guarantee of repayment 
or minimum return in the trust contract, the structure of CIT transactions 
and past precedents of bailouts strongly suggest otherwise. 
As to the structure of CIT transactions, the trust company and even the 
borrower in a typical CIT are controlled by or related to the SOE or local 
government that ultimately benefits from the loan.  For example, in a 
government-initiated CIT, the borrower is the financing vehicle of the 
local government.  The underlying loan is guaranteed by its associated 
company or secured by government land, and the purpose of the loan is 
to fund its real estate or infrastructure projects.  Furthermore, the trust 
plan may be sold by a state-owned commercial bank controlled by the 
same government.  All these features give the appearance that the trust is 
backed by the local government, who provides an implicit guarantee, even 
though they have no legal obligation to do so. 
The prevalent practice of bailouts has also contributed to investors’ 
assumption of an implicit guarantee.38  Ironically, the first few instances 
of out-of-court compensation were ordered by the regulators.  Around 
2005, a number of high-profile trusts defaulted on maturity. The 
regulators intervened and ordered a repayment arrangement based on 
expediency rather than principles of trust law. This was, essentially, an 
executive-ordered settlement.  For example, in the widely publicized case 
of the Jinxin Trust,39 the trust plan collected over CNY 80 million from 
 
 38. For media and academic discussion of implicit guarantee, see David Keohane & Josh Noble, 
For the “2010 China Credit / Credit Equals Gold #1 Collective Trust Product” Bugs Out There, FIN. 
TIMES (London) (Jan. 17, 2014), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/01/17/1744832/for-the-2010-china-
credit-credit-equals-gold-1-collective-trust-product-bugs-out-there/ [https://perma.cc/QB52-69BW]; 
Deng Gang, Gangxing Duifu de Falv Zhili [Legal Control of Implicit Guarantee] 97(2) JINRONG FAYUAN 
[FINANCIAL LAW FORUM]  205, 211 (2018), 
https://www.finlaw.pku.edu.cn/jrfy/gk/2018_jrfy/jrfnzd97j/270913.htm, [https://perma.cc/76QH-RJ2M]. 
 39. See Jinxin Yupin Xintuo Yinbao Xintuo Duifu Weiji [The Incident of Jinxin Trust Set Off Trust 
Default Risks], SINA FIN. (China) (July 12, 2004), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-07-
12/10373679952.shtml [https://perma.cc/V4J5-UNS2].  This involves a CIT that had collected over CNY 
80 million from investors for the purported merger and acquisition of two dairy companies, in return for 
a fixed return of 5% at the end of the trust period upon the exercise of a repurchase option of the shares 
of the target companies.  Six months after the issuance of the trust, the companies went into financial 
difficulties, and it transpired that the trust had not acquired any share ownership in these companies.  
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investors for the purported merger and acquisition of two dairy 
companies. In return, investors received a fixed return of five percent at 
the end of the trust period upon the exercise of a repurchase option of the 
shares of the target companies.  Six months after the issuance of the trust, 
when the dairy companies encountered financial difficulties, the trust 
funds were unlawfully transferred to the dairy companies without any 
allocation of shares in favor of the trust.  The trust company was ordered 
to repay small investors CNY 100,000 or less the full amount of their 
principal, and to repay those who invested more than CNY 100,000 90% 
of their principal.  Senior employees of the trust company were convicted 
of the crime of illegal absorption of public savings.  Over time, with 
repeated instances of bailouts, these aberrations have become the norm.40  
Trust companies even formalize this practice by so-called “drawer 
agreements,” in which they enter into shadow contracts—outside of the 
trust contract—to pay liquidated damages very much at the level of a 
guarantee of return.41 
2. Causes and Implications 
Several factors contributed to this peculiar phenomenon.42  First, 
ignorance of trust law and the economic reality of such trusts as fixed-
term loans to government-related entities encouraged investors’ 
assumption that the authorities would eventually come to their rescue.  
The investors of the Jinxin Trust, for example, organized demonstrations 
in front of the branch office of Shanghai Communications Bank, through 
which they bought the trust product, to put pressure on the government to 
provide a bailout.   
Second, concerns about political stability motivated regulators and 
local governments to exert political pressure on trust companies to do so.  
In a 2004 circular to trust companies, the CBRC stated that defaults of 
 
 40. A few examples of high profile bailouts are: Zhengzhi Jinkai No. 1 Trust Plan of Zhongcheng 
Xintuo Co Ltd in 2014 (CNY 3 billion plan with promised return at 9.5%-11% to acquire shares of coal 
mining enterprises; on default, investors were given the option to have the principal restored without 
interest, or obtain shares in the underlying enterprise); Jixin-Songhuajiang No. 77 Trust Plan of Jilin Trust 
Co Ltd in 2014 (CNY 970 million invested in coal mining); Xinhua Xintuo-Shanghai Lvren Trust Plan of 
Xinhua Trust Co Ltd in 2014 (CNY 850 million at 9.8%-12% return rate, invested in real estate 
corporation), discussed in Zhongguo Xintuo Ye Xianru Duifu Weiji [Chinese Trust Industry in Default 
Crisis], JRJ.COM, http://trust.jrj.com.cn/focus/trustcri/ [https://perma.cc/JQ4X-2QT3]. 
 41. See, e.g., Wangmou Su Shanghai Mou Zichan Guanli Youxian Gongsi Weituo Licai Hetong 
Jiufen An (王某诉上海某资产管理有限公司委托理财合同纠纷案) [A Case Concerning Entrusted 
Wealth Management Contract between Wang and A Shanghai Asset Management Ltd Co] (2012) 
Shanghai Minhang Min Si (Shang) Chu Civil Case No. 4, Mar. 15, 2012 (China). 
 42. See Li Jiang Jun & Fan Wen Xiang, Jinrong Licai Chanpin Gangxing Duifu Kunju de 
Chengyin Jiqi Huajie [Problems and Resolutions of the Rigid Payment Dilemma of Wealth Management 
Products] 11 XIANDAI JINGJI TANTAO [MODERN ECON. RESEARCH] 44-48 (2014). 
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CITs must be reported to their local branch, which would immediately 
suspend the trust company from issuing new collective trusts.43  To avert 
such a drastic sanction and the disruption of business, trust companies 
were left with no feasible alternative but to bail out such plans.   
Third, trust companies were also eager to protect their commercial 
reputation and maintain the client base that they had expended 
tremendous efforts to build.  As investor expectation of compensatory 
payment built up, they bailed plans out even in the absence of orders from 
the CBRC.   
Fourth, and ironically, trust companies often fund the bailouts by 
infringing beneficiaries’ rights.  For example, the lack of enforcement and 
proper trust accounting standards allow them to retain any balance of 
profits that may remain after meeting the fixed rate of return promised to 
the investors.  Yet this amounts to a clear breach of the no-profit rule that 
is set out in the Trust Law and the CIT Measures. 44  Trust companies also, 
through rolling the issuance of funds and aggregating fund management, 
mix the funds of trusts with different maturity periods into a commingled 
pool without separate accounting, and pay bailouts from pooled assets.45  
This, in effect, misappropriates funds from other trust plans and diverts 
them to unprofitable plans.  Alternatively, the trust companies roll over 
investors’ rights from unprofitable plans to new one, and in doing so blur 
the line between CITs and Ponzi schemes.46   
The implications of implicit guarantee for the financial market are far-
reaching.47  The perception of guaranteed profitability disincentivizes 
 
 43. Notice on Further Regulating Collective Trust Schemes (promulgated by the CBRC, Dec. 7, 
2004, effective Dec. 7, 2004), art. 18, 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docDOC_ReadView/1077.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2020). 
 44. Article 26 of the Chinese Trust Law provides that except obtaining remuneration according to 
the provisions of this Law, the trustee may not seek interests for himself by using the trust property; Article 
26 of the CIT Measures also provides that: application of the trust funds by the trust company shall be 
consistent with the investment direction and strategies agreed upon in the documents of the Trust Scheme. 
 45. Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Jinrong Wending Fenxi Xiaozhu [FIN. STABILITY ANALYSIS 
GROUP, PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA], CHINA FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 120 (2017), 
https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-07/06/5208092/files/572fec1a7b41440295c62fe548ad56fd.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K48F-FHLU]. 
 46. Zhang Minjie, Woguo Jihe Zijin Xintuo Jihua Touzizhe Quanyi Baohu zhi Guankui [Protection 
of Investors in Chinese Collective Capital Trust Schemes] 27(5) YANJIUSHENG FAXUE [GRADUATE LAW 




 47. Dan Awrey, Law and Finance in the Chinese Shadow Banking System, 48(1) CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 1, 42-43 (2015); see also Guo Wei, Jinrong Jigou Baodi Licai de Hefaxing Miju uu Kunjing [The 
Legality and Dilemma of Implicit Guarantee by Financial Institutions] 43(5) BEIJING DAXUE XUEBAO 
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investors from rigorous risk assessment and encourages underlying 
borrowers to compete purely by offering higher, often unrealistic interest 
rates.  Trust companies also have little incentive to scrutinize aggressive 
borrowers, as a higher interest rate gives them a wider margin for personal 
profits.  As a result, the practice shields low-grade debts and disrupts the 
flow of capital to truly competitive economic activities.  It also transfers 
the risks of unprofitable investments to financial institutions and creates 
a time bomb that ticks in the shadow of the financial market.48  
3. Regulatory control 
In 2014, CBRC issued the Notice on Issues Concerning Improving the 
Organizational Management System of Banks’ Wealth Management 
Business to urge banks not to undertake guaranteed payment, which had 
limited effect on prevalent practice.49  Regulatory intervention finally 
came in April 2018, when the central bank and three regulatory bodies 
jointly issued the Guiding Opinions on Regulating the Asset Management 
Business of Financial Institutions (“Asset Management Opinions”).50  
The Opinions adopt two strategies.  First, they provide a non-exhaustive 
list of situations that are deemed to provide implicit guarantee and are 
hence prohibited under Article 2(2).  These include: (1) direct guarantees 
of the principal or returns for a product; (2) transfers of the rights of 
different investor groups by means such as a rollover in order to provide 
such guarantee; and (3) direct payments by the issuer or manager of an 
investment product on default, whether through raising funds on its own 
or commissioning another institution to do so.51  This inclusive definition 
closes the loophole left by the Trust Companies Measures and Trust Plans 
Measures, which only proscribes the express undertaking of guaranteed 
returns in trust contracts.   
Second, a series of prudential measures aimed at preventing out-of-
 
VM3RGgxVDNxVHJXTTFGckNVUjdxZlpPZG0= [https://perma.cc/W4Y7-G6CN]. 
 48. See Ning Zhu, CHINA'S GUARANTEED BUBBLE: HOW IMPLICIT GOVERNMENT SUPPORT HAS 
PROPELLED CHINA'S ECONOMY WHILE CREATING SYSTEMIC RISK, Ch. 11 (McGraw-Hill Education, 2016). 
 49. See supra note 27.  For a thorough critique, see Pu Zhengxing, Ziguan Xingui de Yaodian 
Fenxi yu Yingxiang Qianzhan [Analysis of the Key Points and Effects of the New Asset Management Rules] 




 50. Guiding Opinions on Regulating the Asset Management Business of Financial Institutions 
(promulgated by the People’s Bank of China, China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, & the State Admin. of Foreign 
Exchange, Apr. 27, 2018, effective Apr. 27, 2018) [hereafter Asset Management Opinions], unofficial 
trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=ff2037951095d290bdfb&lib=law [https://perma.cc/J9XF-
8DAD]. 
 51. Id. at art. 19. 
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court payments are reiterated.  For example, the assets of a trust product 
must be held by a custodian separately from the trustee.52  There must be 
separate accounting and segregation of funds, and the pooling of cash for 
rolling issuance and aggregate operation is prohibited.53  To reduce 
leverage levels, investors’ risk tolerance level and the risk rating of the 
invested assets must be matched.54 Additionally, financial institutions are 
required to create a risk reserve from ten percent of the management fees 
to meet legal liability arising from its own breaches of duties.55  
Importantly, Article 18 of the Opinions mandates the management of trust 
assets on the basis of their net value, so that the value of the trust product 
directly reflects the value of its underlying assets.  To facilitate the 
calculation of the net value of trust assets, the article requires proper 
accounting and auditing of accounts in accordance with national 
standards, and submission of audit reports to the regulatory authority.  
While this is standard practice in Western markets, and should have been 
adopted along with the reception of the trust in 2001, it has yet to take 
root in China. 
The Asset Management Opinions were supplemented by a series of 
Measures and Notices.56  The impact of these drastic measures is palpable.  
Since mid-2018, there have been media reports of defaults of over 100 
trust plans, some of which even involve trust products backed by the 
provincial governments of Tianjin and Guizhou.57  Even though this latest 
 
 52. Id. at art. 14. 
 53. Id. at art. 15. 
 54. Id. at art. 16. 
 55. Id. at art. 17. 
 56. Notice on Commencing the Work on “Consolidating Achievements in Irregularity 
Rectification and Promoting Compliance Building” (promulgated by the China Banking and Insur. 
Regulatory Comm’n, May 8, 2019, effective May 8, 2019), art. 11, sec. IV, Annex 1, 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-05/17/content_5392623.htm (last visited March 19, 2020), unofficial 
trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=660b9d9a1b0a235abdfb&lib=law.  See also, in relation to 
other financial institutions, Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Wealth Management 
Business of Commercial Banks, supra note 15; Measures for the Administration of Wealth Management 
Subsidiary Companies of Commercial Banks, supra note 15, arts. 31 & 55; Provisions on the 
Administration of Operation of Privately Offered Asset Management Plans of Securities and Futures 
Business Institutions (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Oct. 22, 2018, effective Oct. 
22, 2018), art. 31, http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201810/P020181022809298932631.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans., http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=29332&lib=law 
[https://perma.cc/F58A-624W]; Measures for the Administration of the Privately Offered Asset 
Management Business of Securities and Futures Business Institutions (promulgated by the China Sec. 
Regulatory Comm’n, Oct. 22, 2018, effective Oct. 22, 2018), art. 4, 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201810/P020181022804792210933.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 
2020), unofficial trans., http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=3d62931e3f373daabdfb&lib=law 
[https://perma.cc/68CZ-3QD8].  
 57. Don Weinland and  Sherry Fei Ju, Public Default at Chinese Trust Company Highlights Cracks 
in Market, FIN. TIMES (London) (June 25, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/11a89df6-9720-11e9-8cfb-
30c211dcd229 (last visited Mar. 19, 2020); Liang Hong & Denise Jia, Anxin Trust Delays $405 Million 
Payment to 1,000 Investors, CAIXIN GLOBAL (China) (May 22, 2019), 
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round of regulatory crackdown appears effective, regulation cannot, and 
should not, replace the long overdue development of private law remedies 
which have thus far been side-lined.58  This is because the regulatory 
approach is liable to the influences of political and commercial 
considerations, as is borne out in the development of shadow banking in 
China. 
D. Shadow Banking 
1. The abuse of the trust 
Contrary to CITs, SITs are established by single investors.  They are 
typically used in a similar way as special purpose vehicles found in 
Western jurisdictions.  Because of China’s unique regulatory 
environment, only the trust license can invest in different financial 
markets.  This allows trust companies to leverage on the regulatory 
privilege to provide “channelling service” for other institutions that are 
restricted from making such investments.  Ironically, the channelling 
business that the Chinese government now seeks to curb grew out of 
China’s CNY 4 trillion (USD 56.7 billion) stimulus package in 2009 to 
counteract the global financial crisis.  Through a number of notices, 
CBRC allowed banks to issue wealth management products that pooled 
funds from customers for investment in trusts managed by trust 
companies.59  It did urge trust companies to actively manage the 
 
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-05-22/anxin-trust-delays-405-million-payment-to-1000-investors-
101418350.html [https://perma.cc/7UDH-LWRA]; Xie Yu, Tianjin Government-backed Property Firm 
May Default as China’s Deleveraging Campaign Reaches State-owned Sector, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (May 14, 2018) (Hong Kong), https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2146070/tianjin-
government-backed-property-firm-may-default-chinas (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).  
 58. Liu Yan, Daziguan Shangweifa Zhi Jiuwen [Study on the Asset Management Opinions as 




 59. Notice on Issuing the Guidelines on the Business Cooperation between Banks and Trust 
Companies (promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 4, 2008, effective Dec. 4, 
2008), 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docDOC_ReadView/20081222D75C0AA1792B5FBBFFC19BF
9CCDB9000.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans., 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7263&CGid= [https://perma.cc/PPG6-CH85]); 
Notice on the Relevant Matters concerning the Cooperation between Banks and Trust Companies 
(promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 14, 2004, effective Dec. 14, 2004), 
unofficial trans., http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8109&CGid= 
[https://perma.cc/29W8-TVF7]; Notice on Regulating Relevant Matters on Wealth Management 
Cooperation between Banks and Trust Companies (promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory 
Comm’n, Aug. 5, 2010, effective Aug. 5, 2010), unofficial trans., 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=136288&lib=law [https://perma.cc/DNR4-3B2R]. 
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investments in these trusts, and not merely serve as a channel for the 
banks,60 albeit very few paid credence to the request.  At its height in mid-
2010, 84% of business trusts in China were SITs; their percentage share 
of the trust market declined gradually, along with the tightening of 
regulation, to 42% in the first quarter of 2019.61 
Channelling business has become the heart of shadow banking in 
China, where the trust is not so much misunderstood but rather is misused 
for the purposes of regulatory arbitrage.  It is beyond the scope of the 
present Article to explore this vast subject, which also affects other 
financial institutions.62 Instead, this Article focuses on the use of the 
business trust in shadow banking, the most prominent example of which 
is the bank-trust cooperation.  Banks use the SIT to conceal risky 
corporate loans off their balance sheets in order to bypass their loan-to-
deposit ratio and to invest in prohibited industries fenced out of the state 
credit system.  This is achieved by nesting the SIT in multiple layers of 
coordinated loans.  For example, instead of lending directly to the target 
corporate borrower, the bank lends to an intermediate bank which has 
capacity under its loan-to-deposit ratio to make corporate loans.  The 
intermediate bank loans the same amount to an intermediate company,63 
which then subscribes to an SIT that makes the loan to the target 
borrower.  The intermediate company, which is the beneficiary of the SIT, 
then assigns its beneficial right back through the chain of transactions to 
the original lending bank.  This nesting of layers allows the debt to be 
booked as an interbank loan, for which less capital needs to be set aside 
because they are considered less risky.  The original bank also books the 
trust beneficial interest on its balance sheet.  Bank-trust cooperation may 
also take a simpler, alternative structure, which is neatly illustrated by a 
recent decision publicized by the Chinese Supreme Court.  In Shenzen 
City Xili Baoen Fudi Graveyard Co. Ltd. v. Everbright Xinglong Trust 
Co. Ltd. and in Beijing Peking University Hi-Tech Industrial Investment 
Co. Ltd. v. Everbright Xinglong Trust Co. Ltd.,64 Baoshang Bank 
 
 60. Notice on Regulating Relevant Matters on Wealth Management Cooperation between Banks 
and Trust Companies (promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Jan. 13, 2011, effective 
Jan. 13, 2011), art. 2, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-01/20/content_1789471.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 
2020), unofficial trans., http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=11524 
[https://perma.cc/4TPB-LF33]. 
 61. See Main Business Data, supra note 9. 
 62. See generally SHEN WEI, SHADOW BANKING IN CHINA: RISKS, REGULATIONS AND POLICY 
(2016); Steven L. Schwarcz, Shadow Banking and Regulation in China and Other Developing Countries, 
DUKE LAW SCH. (Nov. 16, 2016), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3694 (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2020). 
 63. Banks are not allowed to lend directly to trust companies, hence the interposition of an 
intermediate corporate borrower. 
 64. Ziguan Xingui Shenzhenshi Xili Baoen Fudi Muyuan Youxiang Gongsi, Guangda Xinglong 
Xintuo Youxian Zeren Gongsi Jiekuan Hetong Jiufen 
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established an SIT with the defendant trust company to extend a loan to 
the appellants to bypass the bank lending rate of 6%.65  The interest rate 
for the loan was 11.8%, and the interest payable on default was as high as 
17.7%, giving Baoshang Bank close to double the profit margin it obtains 
from the official lending rate. 
Furthermore, insurance companies that are eager to boost profits also 
use the trust to skirt regulatory restriction on investment in the stock 
market and on permitted types of investments.  In fact, they have emerged 
as a major lender for cash-strapped property developers and local 
governments, as the long maturity period of loans for construction and 
infrastructure projects matches the long-term liabilities of insurance 
companies.  Often the loans are arranged directly with the borrower and 
the trust company only provides channelling service with no active duty 
in managing the underlying trust assets, let alone controlling their risks.  
These opaque and multi-layered loan structures make it difficult for the 
regulators to assess the actual risks borne by the chain of companies 
involved.  The spread of shadow banking from banks to other institutions 
also means that hidden credit risks in China are much larger than current 
financial data suggest, and a small vulnerability may cause a systemic 
shock.   
2. Paradigm shift in regulatory policy 
In 2013, the Chinese government began its efforts to regulate shadow 
banking.  In the first four years, it took a measured approach that did not 
prohibit channelling business per se, but only its (mis)use to circumvent 
regulation.  As these efforts proved ineffective, there was a paradigm shift 
in regulatory policy in 2017 to: (1) prohibit such business outright; (2) 
assume centralized, cross-market oversight of financial institutions; and 
(3) adopt standardized regulation based on products rather than the 
institutions that operate them. The latter two measures aim at closing 
loopholes that make regulatory arbitrage possible. 
These regulatory efforts can be traced back to 2013, when the State 
Council issued an internal document, the Notice on Issues Concerning 
 
(资管新规深圳市西丽报恩福地墓园有限公司、光大兴陇信托有限责任公司借款合同纠纷) [A 
Loan Contract Dispute between Shenzen City Xili Baoen Fudi Graveyard Co Ltd and Everbright Xinglong 
Trust Co Ltd] (2015) Min Er Civil Case No. 393, June 29, 2018 (China); Ziguan Xingui Beijing Beida 
Gaokeji Chanye Touzi Gongsi, Guangda Xinglong Xintuo Youxian Zeren Gongsi Jiekuan Hetong 
Jiufen(资管新规北京北大高科技产业投资有限公司、光大兴陇信托有限责任公司借款合同纠纷) 
[A Loan Contract Dispute between Beijing Peking University Hi-Tech Industrial Investment Co Ltd and 
Everbright Xinglong Trust Co Ltd (2015) Min Er Civil Case No. 401, June 29, 2018 (China) (‘Everbright 
Xinglong Trust Cases’).  The two cases were heard together. 
 65. The figures are based on the facts of Beijing Peking University Hi-Tech Industrial Investment 
Co Ltd v. Everbright Xinglong Trust Co Ltd, id. 
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Strengthening the Supervision of Shadow Banking (the “Notice”).66  The 
Notice sought to strike a balance between risk prevention and financial 
innovation, and paved the way for a spate of concrete regulatory 
measures.  In 2014, the CBRC issued the Guiding Opinions on the Risk 
Supervision of Trust Companies,67 and the Guidelines for the 
Consolidated Management and Supervision of Commercial Banks (2014 
Revision),68 the latter of which was the first time the regulator defined 
channelling business.69  These instruments do not prohibit bank-trust 
cooperation per se, but urge trust companies not to help other institutions 
bypass regulation.  The purposes of these Guidelines are threefold: (1) to 
stipulate unequivocally that the risks of channelled investments are borne 
by the originating banks; (2) to require banks to disclose the risk 
allocation in written contracts; and (3) to bring these investments on to 
the balance sheets and capital adequacy requirements of these banks.  The 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission also issued a similar notice for 
insurance companies, albeit it prescribed more stringent requirements on 
the type and credit rating of the underlying assets.70  
Yet the overheating of the economy continued unabated, prompting the 
latest tide of regulation that involves a paradigm shift in policy.  This 
began with the CBRC announcement in March 2017 to rectify the so 
called “three infringements, three self-profiteering, four incorrectness, 
and ten chaos,” which was followed up by a spate of on-sight inspections 
and instructions for financial institutions to investigate and report their 
own infringing activities.  This was followed by a surge in the number 
and amount of administrative penalties at over 10 times that of the amount 
ordered in the previous year.  The high-handed approach continues to 
date, and was affirmed by the CBRC as effective in curbing shadow-
banking, which has, according to official data, fallen by 21% in 2018 as 
compared to the previous year.71  The percentage share of SITs in the trust 
 
 66. Notice on Issues Concerning Strengthening the Supervision of Shadow Banking (promulgated 
by the Gen. Office of the St. Council, Dec. 31, 2013, effective Dec. 31, 2013), unofficial trans., 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=013f924f0d4a849abdfb&lib=law [https://perma.cc/L6YA-
9GCQ]. 
 67. See supra note 28. 
 68. (promulgated by the China Banking Reg. Comm’n, Dec. 30, 2014, effective Jul. 1, 2015), 
unofficial trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=241371&lib=law [https://perma.cc/D2YC-
N3MP]. 
 69. Id. at art. 87. 
 70. Notice on Matters Concerning the Investments in Collective Fund Trust Plans with Insurance 
Funds (promulgated by the China Ins. Reg. Comm’n, May 5, 2014, effective May 5, 2014), 
http://bxjg.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab5225/info3914862.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans., 
https://www.pkulaw.com/en_law/7fe77ab909d869fabdfb.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2020). 
 71. Statistics available from CBRC, 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/newShouDoc/8940ED1F6F7B4A4DB569D46764C9CBD8.html (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2020). 
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market also dropped from 50% in the last quarter of 2016 to 42% in the 
first quarter of 2019.72 
 
 
Figure 1: Percentage share of assets held under SITs (2010-19) 
 
These strong policy messages led to a series of regulatory instruments.  
In December 2017, CBRC issued the Circular on Regulating Bank-Trust 
Business (“Document 55”),73 which stipulated two new requirements 
whilst reiterating previous regulatory themes: (1) commercial banks 
should rigorously assess, select and monitor the quality of their 
counterparties in bank-trust cooperation through a name-list system; and 
(2) trust companies are strictly prohibited from accepting guarantees from 
originating banks, entering into under-the-table agreements with banks, 
providing channelling services to other institutions, and investing trust 
funds in prohibited asset class such as real estate, local governments, the 
stock market, or sectors with excess production capacity.   
 
 72. See supra note 9. 
 73. Notice on Regulating the Bank-Trust Business (promulgated by the China Banking Reg. 
Comm’n, Nov. 22, 2017, effective Nov. 22, 2017), 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docDOC_ReadView/656ED8C75FA44F0387EF393B842A8A11
.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans., 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=27146&lib=law [https://perma.cc/DAJ9-4HSB]. Prior to 
this Notice, there were: Notice on Special Inspection of Regulatory Arbitrage, Idle Arbitrage and Related 
Arbitrage in the Banking Industry (promulgated by the China Banking Reg. Comm’n, Mar. 28, 2017, 
effective Mar. 28, 2017, http://www.waizi.org.cn/law/18867.html [https://perma.cc/QB7F-ATWW]; 
Notice on Carrying out the Special Campaign against “Inappropriate Innovations, Inappropriate 
Transactions, Inappropriate Incentives, and Inappropriate Collections of Fees” in the Banking Industry 
(promulgated by the China Banking Reg. Comm’n, Apr. 6, 2017, effective Apr. 6, 2017), 
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/ztzl/gbmjcbzc/yjh/201807/t20180704_1209906.html (last visited Mar. 19, 
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Document 55 foreshadowed further concrete measures to combat 
market irregularities.  After a flurry of such measures74 came the Asset 
Management Opinions of April 2018 (the “Opinions”),75 which 
overhauled the previous approach to combating channelling business in 
several ways.  First, the Opinions centralized, cross-market regulation 
through the establishment of the Financial Stability and Development 
Committee under the State Council. Second, the Opinions involved the 
standardization of regulation based on products rather than institutions to 
minimize any room for channelling business to achieve regulatory 
arbitrage. Third, the Opinions standardized the leverage ratio of all asset 
management products and prohibited the launching of asset management 
products (including trusts) to bypass regulation. Finally, the Opinions 
limited such products to just one level of delegation to ensure 
transparency of regulation.   
The Opinions, originally set to take effect on June 30, 2019, have now 
been postponed to December 31, 2020 to allow a longer transition period.  
To guide trust companies to proper trust business, the CBRC has further 
plans to issue Measures for the Management of Capital Trusts before the 
end of 2019 to allow trust companies to operate public placement capital 
trusts with a significantly lowered threshold of CNY 10,000, but subject 
to more rigorous regulatory standards comparable to securities investment 
funds.76  It is too early to tell whether these new measures are but another 
cycle of the cat and mouse regulatory game, or the transformation of the 
trust industry in keeping with its Western counterparts. However, as 
Figure 1 shows, the percentage share of SITs managed by the trust 
industry have indeed been on a steady decline, and will likely continue to 
do so as existing SITs phase out upon maturity. 
3. Judicial activism 
This hard-line approach has also found expression in recent judicial 
practice.  In Everbright Xinglong Trust Cases,77 the borrower argued that 
 
 74. Notice on Further Rectifying the Market Chaos in the Banking Industry (promulgated by the 
China Banking Reg. Comm’n, Jan. 12, 2018, effective Jan. 12, 2018), 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docDOC_ReadView/84BF855655F54ECDA63CBBD0048F6C1
5.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans., 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=0dfab0ebc9f53a7abdfb&lib=law [https://perma.cc/RPG6-
MFUH]; see also Notice on Issues Concerning Strengthening the Supervision of Shadow Banking, supra 
note 66, Annex. 
 75. See Asset Management Opinions, supra note 50. 
 76. See SEC. DAILY, supra note 21. 
 77. Ziguan Xingui Shenzhenshi Xili Baoen Fudi Muyuan Youxiang Gongsi, Guangda Xinglong 
Xintuo Youxian Zeren Gongsi Jiekuan Hetong Jiufen 
(资管新规深圳市西丽报恩福地墓园有限公司、光大兴陇信托有限责任公司借款合同纠纷) [A 
Loan Contract Dispute between Shenzen City Xili Baoen Fudi Graveyard Co Ltd and Everbright Xinglong 
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the loan contract which allowed Baoshang Bank to bypass the bank 
lending rate was an attempt to ‘conceal illegal goals under the disguise of 
legitimate form and hence void under Article 52(3) of the Chinese 
Contract Law.  It understandably did not rely on the Asset Management 
Opinions or any of the recent regulations because the 2011 loan contract 
pre-dated them.  However, in assessing this argument, the Chinese 
Supreme Court cited the Opinions on its own initiative, and summarized 
the regulatory prohibitions before rejecting the argument on the narrow 
ground that the Opinions had not come into effect when the contract was 
made.   
These exhortations are remarkable because they signify the readiness 
of the Court to invoke the Opinions beyond the calls of necessity, and to 
pronounce its view about the effect of the Opinions on such contracts in 
the future.  In doing so, the Court blurred the line between judicial 
adjudication of private law disputes and regulation, and extended the 
reach of the latter into the private law realm.  This is because another 
paragraph, namely Article 52(5) of the Contract Law, provides that a 
contract that violates the compulsory provisions of laws or administrative 
regulations is invalid.78  The Opinions, being issued as a notice to the 
financial institutions, do not fall into either of these two categories.  
However, by invoking them to meet the broad criterion of concealment of 
illegal goals under Article 52(3), the Court has elevated the legal status of 
the Opinions through the backdoor. 
4. Summary 
To recapitulate the discussion so far, there has been rampant abuse of 
the business trust in China by banks, provincial governments and state-
owned enterprises to sidestep regulatory constraints on lending and 
borrowing.  This is possible because in reality, business trusts provide the 
legal façade for operating fixed-income products backed by implicit 
guarantee and masquerading off-balance sheet loans in the shadow 
economy.  At the micro-level, investors’ private law rights under a trust 
are put in abeyance; at the macro-level, the business trust contributes to 
the overheating economy and the time bomb of a financial crisis is ticking 
away.  Regulatory clampdown with tougher rules and enforcement came 
in 2018, with the Supreme Court joining in the concerted efforts to bolster 
 
Trust Co Ltd] (2015) Min Er Civil Case No. 393, June 29, 2018 (China); Ziguan Xingui Beijing Beida 
Gaokeji Chanye Touzi Gongsi, Guangda Xinglong Xintuo Youxian Zeren Gongsi Jiekuan Hetong Jiufen 
(资管新规北京北大高科技产业投资有限公司、光大兴陇信托有限责任公司借款合同纠纷) [A 
Loan Contract Dispute between Beijing Peking University Hi-Tech Industrial Investment Co Ltd and 
Everbright Xinglong Trust Co Ltd (2015) Min Er Civil Case No. 401, June 29, 2018 (China). 
 78. Chinese Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 52(5). 
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the regulatory decrees.  However, a key answer to the current problems 
has thus far been overlooked: it is to go back to the basics of the trust and 
reinforce the private law rights protected by this institution, for only then 
would the concept be immune from abuse and distortion. 
IV. RETURNING THE TRUST TO ITS ORIGINAL ROOTS 
A.  Inherent Limitations of Regulation 
After almost two decades since the promulgation of the Trust Law, 
aberrations in trust practice have been tackled almost exclusively by 
tightening regulation.  However, proper trust practice has yet to take root 
in China as trusts continue to be misused to provide financing outside of 
state credit limits.  There have been cycles of boom and bust that 
coincided with the loosening and tightening of regulation.  While the 
abuse of trust for regulatory arbitrage can indeed be tackled by closing 
regulatory loopholes, the source of the other problems mentioned in this 
Article lies in the systemic distortion of the trust concept in China which 
cannot be solved by regulation alone. 
The use of trusts to operate high-yield loan services, the improper 
selling of trust products to investors, and the practice of implicit guarantee 
are all due, in great part, to the failure to adhere to the proper trust concept, 
with the result that the original allocation of rights and risks in a trust that 
has made it so successful has become dysfunctional.  The proper solution 
is to bring the Chinese trust in line with the core private law principles of 
the trust.79  Regulation can only facilitate this process through 
administrative or criminal sanctions.  As the regulatory cycles in the past 
two decades have shown, regulatory policy may be influenced by fiscal 
and political considerations.  Nor does regulation achieve the supposed 
allocation of risks in a trust relationship, which is a matter for the courts 
through allocating legal liability inter partes.  Unfortunately, the 
regulators’ administrative intervention in the Jinxin trust scandal has 
robbed the courts of the golden opportunity to develop trust jurisprudence.  
 
 79. See also Liu Yan, supra note 58; Li Chen, Ziguan Chanpin Gangxing Duifu de Jianguan Jinlu 
yu Sikao [Prospects and Thoughts on the Regulation of Implicit Guarantees on Asset Management 
Products] JINRONG FAYUAN [FINANCIAL LAW FORUM] 194, 203 (2018), 
http://new.big5.oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFQ&dbname=CJFDLASN2019&f
ilename=JRFY201802038&v=MjE4MjU3cWZaT2RtRnl6a1Y3cktMei9OZDdHNEg5bk1yWTlHYklS
OGVYMUx1eFlTN0RoMVQzcVRyV00xRnJDVVI= [https://perma.cc/C76G-SHCB]; Zhou Minjia, 
Lun Xintuo Gangxing Duifu Falv Guizhi de Wanshan [Thoughts on Improving the Legal Regulations of 
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By compelling the trust company to make out-of-court compensatory 
payments, the regulators set a dangerous precedent.  Worse still, as the 
amount of these payments is set by considerations of expediency rather 
than the legal entitlements of the investors (that is, a higher level of 
compensation for smaller investors who are larger in number), private law 
redress for breach of trust is further side-lined. 
B. The Essential Core of the Trust 
It is time the core features of the trust took root in Chinese private law.  
The past two decades have exposed the inadequacy of the Trust Law, and 
the need for its broad provisions to be rendered into concrete operating 
principles for a jurisdiction that does not previously have the concept of 
a trust.  This can be achieved by amendment of the Law itself, or as often 
happens in China, the promulgation of a Judicial Interpretation of the 
Trust Law by the Supreme Court.  Between the two methods, there is 
more scope for the Judicial Interpretation to flesh out the operating 
principles for direct application by the courts. 
Aberrations of the business trust practice that could have been avoided 
by observing the core features of the trust abound.  The payment of 
bailouts from pooled assets was a direct infringement of the ring-fencing 
of the trust property and the trustee’s duty to provide accounts on demand.  
Similarly, in retaining profits from the investment of trust funds and 
giving investors fixed interest payments, trust companies breached the no-
profit rule and ignored the important principle that profits and losses 
arising from the trust property were attributed to the beneficiaries.  
Finally, the prevalence of bailouts shows that private law reliefs for 
breaches of trust were simply cast to the wayside.  A closer examination 
of these features is in order. 
Three of these core features, namely the ring-fencing of trust property, 
the attribution of profits and losses to the beneficiary, and the trustee’s 
duty to provide accounts, can be considered together because they pertain 
to the proprietary effect of the trust relationship, which has been under-
appreciated in China.  For example, a vast amount of official literature 
and commentaries depict the trust in a saying that does not clearly 
distinguish a trust from an agency.  The saying describes the trust as a 
legal relationship whereby, “having received a mandate, one manages 
property for another” (shouren zhituo, dairen licai).80  It captures the 
 
 80. See, for example, Jianchi Shouren Zhituo Dairen Licai de Fazhan Fangxiang [Insisting on the 
Development Direction of Receiving a Mandate and Managing Property for Another], ZHENG QUAN SHI 
BAO [SECURITIES TIMES], http://trust.jrj.com.cn/2008/11/0708442632450.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/7XXH-X2A4]; Ji Hong, Shouren Zhituo Dairen Licai Xintuo Ye Jianjie [Receiving a 
Mandate and Managing Property for Another – A Brief Survey of the Trust Industry] 3 SHIJIE ZHISHI 
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representative nature of the trust relationship, but fails to accentuate two 
important aspects. First, the trustee’s mandate is granted in virtue of his 
power to administer the property as if he were the owner. Second, the trust 
relationship is not merely about the trustee’s managerial service, rather it 
creates a segregated and fluctuating fund in relation to which the 
beneficiary has enforceable rights.   
It is precisely the failure of the trust companies to observe this latter 
feature that renders CITs trusts in name only.  With the benefit of 
hindsight, although the Trust Law lays down the principle of segregation 
of trust property in Article 16,81 it does not set forth concrete operating 
rules to give real teeth to this principle.  For example, Articles 20, 33 and 
49 give the beneficiaries the right to inspect trust accounts, but limit this 
right to the receipt of an annual report.  For trust products that involve a 
short maturity period, some as short as one year, this right is illusory.  It 
is disappointing that despite the recent tightening of regulation, this 
important issue is dealt with by industry guidelines issued by the China 
Trustee Association, which only provides that a trust company shall 
provide an account on a regular basis as agreed in the trust document.82  
Given the unequal bargaining power between trust companies and 
investors, the stipulation is unlikely to have any real impact.  A better 
approach is to recognize the right of the beneficiary to demand an account 
on reasonable notice.  Equally, the Trust Law does not stipulate the 
principle that losses arising from authorized dealings of trust property are 
attributable to the beneficiary.  Instead, this principle only forms part of 
the mandatory statement on the disclosure of subscription, is only part of 
the mandatory content of the statement, and  only finds itself in the 
disclosure provisions of the CIT Measures.83  It is hoped that these gaps 
can be plugged in a future amendment of the Trust Law or Judicial 
Interpretation of the Supreme Court. 
Turning to the no-profit rule, the Trust Law is unclear as to its nature 
and scope, thus allowing trust companies (and trustees generally) to 
ignore the prohibition with impunity.84  Article 26 of the Law states that 
 




 81. See Chinese Trust Law, supra note 1 , art. 16 (the trust property shall be segregated from the 
trustee’s own property); article 18: claims and liabilities arising from different trust properties should not 
be offset against each other; article 29: the trustee shall separate trust property from its own property and 
the properties of different trusts for management and account-keeping purposes.  Articles 16 and 29 are 
reiterated in articles 3 and 29 of the Trust Companies Measures, supra note 7. 
 82. Guidelines on Due Performance of Trustee Duties by Trust Companies, supra note 16, art. 52. 
 83. CIT Measures, supra note 7, art. 11(3). 
 84. For a study of the basis of the fiduciary duty in China, see Jianbo Lou and Xuelian Jiang, Xinyi 
Yiwu de Fali Yanjiu – Jianlun Dalu Faxi Guojia Xintuofa yu Qita Falv Xinyi Yiwu Guize de Hudong [A 
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except when a trustee receives authorized remuneration, it shall not obtain 
personal profits from the use of trust property.85  Under Article 35, 
remuneration for the trustee may be authorized by express stipulation in 
the trust contract or upon subsequent agreement.  This invites the 
argument that when a CIT contract stipulates a fixed rate of return for the 
investors, it is authorizing the trust company to retain as remuneration any 
profits it makes from the trust fund over and beyond the fixed rate of 
return.  On this view, the trust company owes no duty to account for these 
profits. 
The scope of Article 26 is also limited.  It states the no-profit rule, but 
not the no-conflict rule, which has a distinct scope of its own. Besides, 
the article prohibits the making of profits from the use of trust property, 
but leaves open profits arising from the use of the trustee’s position.  
These gaps are now expressly addressed in the Trust Companies 
Measures, where breaches are remedied by administrative sanctions such 
as confiscation of unlawful profits or administrative fines.86  Such awards, 
if indeed ordered, may provide greater deterrence than remedies.  
However, their availability is subject to the initiative and discretion of the 
regulators, who may be influenced by political considerations and state 
policies. 
Finally, the most underdeveloped aspect of the Chinese trust is its 
remedial system.  Remedies for breach of the no-profit rule provide an 
immediate example, for there are significant gaps both in black-letter law 
and judicial practice.  In terms of black-letter law, Article 26 only 
stipulates that personal profits obtained from the use of trust property will 
accrue to the trust property.87  This limited provision leaves the 
beneficiaries without remedy in two common scenarios: (1) where such 
profits are dissipated without the fault of the trustee and hence no such 
property for the beneficiaries to claim; and (2) where the trustee makes 
profits from the use of his position as opposed to trust property.  To claim 
these profits, the beneficiaries will have to try their luck with arguments 
based on general principles in Chinese private law.   
 
Study on the Theory of Fiduciary Duty – with Commentary on the Interaction between the Fiduciary 
Principles in Civil Law and Other Jurisdictions] 1 SHEHUI KEXUE [JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES] 102 
(2017). 
 85. Remuneration can be authorized in advance in the trust contract or subsequently, and the level 
of remuneration can be adjusted by the parties’ agreement: Chinese Trust Law, Article 34.  
 86. Trust Companies Measures, supra note 16, arts. 25, 34(1), 59.  Article 31(7) of the Guidelines 
on the Due Performance of Trustee Duties by Trust Companies, supra note 16, also prohibits the trust 
company from ‘seeking illicit gains or conducting commercial bribes for itself’, but as industry guidelines, 
they do not have the force of law or administrative regulation.  
 87. Cf, Trust Act, Law No. 108, of 2006, sec. 3, art. 40(3) (Japan), 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_main?re=02&vm=02&id=2476#en_ch3sc3at2 
[https://perma.cc/EDN2-P7KH] (providing generally for restitution of profits obtained from a breach of 
fiduciary duty). 
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First, the beneficiary will have to characterise the gains as a loss of the 
chance to make profits on the part of the trust property, and then bring a 
compensatory claim under Article 22 of the Trust Law.  But some gains 
of the trustee cannot be treated as loss of trust property by any stretch of 
imagination. For example, unauthorized profits made from investments 
that are prohibited by the trust contract cannot be recast as profits that the 
trust could have made.  Second, the beneficiary may invoke Article 404 
of the Chinese Contract Law, which stipulates that a mandatary agent 
shall “hand over to the principal any property acquired in handling the 
entrusted affairs.”88  Mandate is a type of agency in civil law jurisdictions 
whereby the agent can act in its own name without having ownership of 
the managed property.  The beneficiary will have to contend that Article 
404 is applicable because the trust contract is a species of contract.  
However, this article is crafted with mandataries rather than trustees in 
mind. In any event, the scope of the article is limited to the first scenario, 
where the unauthorized profits are deemed as trust property and hence the 
trustee is handling “entrusted affairs.”  It does not offer any solution to 
the second scenario.  Before any amendment of the law takes place, one 
can only count on judges to resolve these issues.  Yet this is where the 
least progress has been made in China.  
In terms of judicial practice, administrative intervention and preference 
for criminal sanction have thus far deprived the courts of the opportunity 
to flesh out the implications of Articles 22 and 26.89  In the Jixin Trust, 
for example, the trust company released the trust fund to the target 
company without acquiring any shares; it also transpired that the trust 
company was associated to the target company.  This clearly amounted to 
an unauthorised disposition of trust property and a breach of fiduciary 
duty, which would entitle the beneficiary to rescind the disposition and 
seek a court’s order for restitution of the invested amount or compensation 
for loss from the trustee under Article 22.90  As compared to the 
regulator’s order for bailout based on expediency (full recovery for small 
investors—because they made up the majority of the protectors—and 
90% recovery for large investors), judicial remedy would have been more 
principled and would have provided the basis for developing a rational 
 
 88. See Contract Law, supra note 4, and see generally Ying Chieh Wu, Constructive Trusts in the 
Civil Law Tradition, 12 J. OF EQUITY 320, 327 (2018). 
 89. Chief officers of Jinxin Trust were convicted for illegally taking in deposits from the public 
under article 176 of the Chinese Criminal Law in Jingxin Xintuo Touzi Gufen Gongsi ji Heguipin Dengren 
Feifa Xishou Gongzhong Cunkuan An (金新信托投资股份公司及何贵品等人非法吸收公众存款案) 
[The Case of Illegally Taking in Deposits from the Public by Jinxin Trust Ltd and He Guiping & Ors] 
(2006) Xinjiang Xing Er Criminal Case No. 55, July 18, 2006 (China). 
 90. Assuming that knowledge of the breach of trust was imputed to the target company, it would 
also be liable for restitution of the trust amount and compensation for the loss, albeit it had become 
unworthy to sue. 
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system of trust principles in China. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
In 2018, the regulatory clampdown following the Asset Management 
Opinions caused convulsion in the trust industry.  Cash assets under 
management at these companies fell, but the decline was reversed 
marginally in the first quarter of 2019.91  There are even suggestions that 
regulation may loosen in response to the severe credit crunch that is 
happening at a challenging time of the Chinese economy, because China 
has become too dependent on shadow banking to shoulder the shock of a 
drastic clean up.92  Furthermore, regulatory approaches are liable to the 
influences of politics and fiscal policies.  These remarks highlight the 
dangers of relying solely on regulation to promote proper trust practice 
and show the importance of developing the core principles of trust law.   
It is only when a rational system of rights and remedies is developed in 
the private law realm that the trust will be immune from distortion.  This 
Article has proposed a few clarifications or amendments of the Trust Law 
that would assist this process.  They include stipulations that: (1) both the 
losses and gains made from the use of trust property are borne by the 
beneficiary; (2) the beneficiary has the right to demand the trustee to 
provide an account upon giving reasonable notice; (3) the trustee is also 
prohibited from making unauthorized profits from the use of its position; 
and (4) it is liable to account for any unauthorized profits made from the 
use of trust property or its position as trustee.  These propositions are 
rudimentary to any common law jurisdictions, but precisely because they 
have not been adhered to in China, the Chinese business trust has yet to 






 91. See Main Business Data, supra note 9. 
 92. Anjani Trivedi, For China, Kicking a $9 Trillion Habit is Tough Work, BLOOMBERG (N.Y.) 
(June 26, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-25/china-s-reliance-on-shadow-
banking-is-growing-not-shrinking [https://perma.cc/676S-XUCA]. 
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